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This study examines the role of exploitative learning in entrepreneurial opportunity 
recognition at the time of war and peace. Utilising some unique, qualitative, 
longitudinal oral history interviews collected from informants from a family business, 
our qualitative finding indicates that, at the time of war and conflict, risk and physical 
immobility restricted exploitation within a narrowly confined geographical and 
knowledge contexts. Our case illustrates that success under such condition is largely 
determined by whether one can efficiently exploit their existing capabilities under 
contextual and circumstantial constraints, and to reconfigure their capabilities utilising 
local knowledge and resources. When peace returns, our findings indicate whilst there 
is no obvious external barrier for radical exploration, exploitation success during war 
and conflict may result in competency trap, undermining an organisation’s 
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Introduction  
 Studies have long suggested that a balance between exploitation and exploration is 
essential for successful product development (Sheremata, 2000; Iansiti and Clark, 
1994) and long term performance (March, 1991; Boisot and Child, 1999). Despite this, 
however, exploitative learning is often seen as the ‘ugly’, ‘less glamourous’ sister of 
explorative learning. It is mostly involved directed search emphasizing limiting 
variety and building closely on the existing knowledge base (McGrath, 2001). 
Explorative learning, on the other hand, is often seen as the more exotic variant with 
emphasises on creativity, originality and risk taking (McGrath, 2001; Katila, 2002). It 
is often credited with the development of ground-breaking, radical innovations and 
technologies of which the firm has little previous experience in. 
 
In terms of the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities (see Hills, Lumpkin and 
Singh (1997), Lumpkin, Hills and Schrader (2004), Lumpkin and Lichtenstein (2005), 
Schwartz and Teach (2000), and Wakkee and van der Sijde (2010), for further 
analysis), the role of explorative learning once again dominates the existing literature. 
Exploitative learning is generally associated with business opportunities utilising low 
innovation and growth potential (Schildt et al., 2005). They are likely to confined 
firms to “true and tried” entrepreneurial options that are not necessarily spectacular 
but unlikely to fail. Explorative learning, on the other hand, enables entrepreneurs to 
develop first mover advantage, by rapidly opening up new market and gain market 
share before competitors entering the market. That said, although explorative learning 
is more able to create innovation, it tends to be less predictable. March (1991) states 
that: “Compared to returns from exploitation, returns from exploration are 
systematically less certain, more remote in time, and organizationally more distant 
from the locus of action and adaptation… The certainty, speed, proximity, and clarity 
of feedback ties exploitation to its consequences more quickly and more precisely 
than is the case with exploration” (p73). This suggests that balancing explorative and 
exploitative learning remain crucial for firm in developing a strong business 
foundation, as well as developing business ideas.  
 
Understandably, most studies in the field focused on explorative learning in the 
knowledge-based, intangible assets dominated, rapid-changing and globalised sectors 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Ambrosini et al., 2009). Our study switch the context 
from one that is munificent and dynamic to the historical context of war and conflict 
where the environment can be considered as penurious and unpredictable, and focus 
on exploitative rather than explorative learning. War and conflict undoubtedly fell 
within the high-velocity or dynamic markets category proposed by Zollo and Winter 
(1999) and Rindova and Kotha (2001). As with any other evolutionary conditions, 
radical and unpredictable changes such as blockade, change in war effort, price of 
goods and hyperinflation all create disequilibrium that prevents organisations from 
rationally and deliberately codifying these changed experiences (Zollo and Winter, 
2002 and Thomas et al., 2001) and precisely specifying future events (Pandza and 
Thorpe, 2009). War and conflict can also cause random destruction on people, 
building, infrastructure, and transport links, with the capacity to make previous 
valuable resources redundant overnight (Coble, 2003). These unpredictable changes 
resulted in highly ambiguous industry structure with different players shifting in and 
out of the picture regularly. It has been suggested that under such extremely volatile 
condition, developing dynamic capabilities is likely to become simple, experiential 
and fragile processes with unpredictable outcomes (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
Nevertheless, what set war and conflict apart from other forms of evolutionary 
environment is that boundary spanning activities are largely limited, due to restricted 
physical movement, cross-sectoral mobility, knowledge dissemination and network 
development opportunities. Under such environment, the ability to acquire additional 
resource is highly restricted. Such restriction may have serious consequences in the 
way that organisations develop and revise their resource and knowledge bases, and 
the way that new opportunity and innovation are developed.  
 
Because of the different context, the learning process under such environment is 
likely to be different. This study examines the case of one family business in Hong 
Kong before, during and after the World War Two. We first examine the case in more 
details, before discussing how exploitative learning has been utilised to pursue and 
develop business opportunities. In the next section, we shall first discuss the 
methodology surrounding our case. The case is divided into four episodes. The four 
episodes which provide an outline of the context and of the businesses that the family 
engaged in, with the prologue focusing on the period before the war, the second 
episode on the first half of the occupation period, the third episode on the second part 
of the occupation when the general situation has worsen and, finally, the epilogue 
examining how the family fared when peace returned. We then examine how the 
finding is related to the existing literature on explorative and exploitative learning and 
concludes with managerial and policy implications.    
 
Research Methodology  
 
The study adopts a qualitative, longitudinal historical approach and examines a family 
businesses as Hong Kong is going into war from a long period of peace, and then 
from being occupied to the return of peace. Unlike previous work, however, this study 
relies extensively on oral history, which is the recording, preservation, interpretation 
and historical reconstruction of significant past events from an eye-witness’s personal 
point of view (Grele, 1996). Although oral histories can be considered to be similar to 
other narratives, the uniqueness of these oral history materials lies with its extensive 
coverage of life events, providing the whole story rather than focusing on a particular 
episode (Thompson, 2000). Such longitudinal emphasis enables the research to cover 
longer epochs and biographic histories (Merlin, 1992; Sheeley, 2002; Umphrey, 2002) 
that is highly suitable to a change-orientated context such as war and conflict. 
Compared with other historical information, oral history enabled the study of 
individual testimonies that detailed the local, native and marginalised point of view 
that were often ignored by mainstream historical sources (Thompson, 2000; Portelli, 
2006), which is particularly important for the context of war and conflict where 
records were completely destroyed or only very few were kept. Of course, the oral 
history approach shares the downside of other narrative analysis including validity, 
reliability, subjectivity (Webster and Mertova, 2007) and particularly the excessive 
reliance on memory (Welch, 2000). Nevertheless, oral historians have argued that, 
when carefully probed and scrutinized, memory can take us to unfamiliar places that 
challenge every convenient or self-serving claim about the past (Thompson, 2000). 
Oral historians have argued for the durability and organisation of memory, and that 
memory on dramatic events such as war and conflict tend to be more lasting 
(Thompson, 2000). In addition, oral narrative accounts, like all sources, should not be 
taken on faith but weighed alongside other accounts and evidence (Thompson, 2000). 
In order to increase its reliability, triangulation will be conducted with institutional 
records in universities and national archives as well as expert verification to create an 
equal dialogue between the historians’ awareness of the broad spatial and temporal 
patterns, and the local narrator’s closely focused personal narratives (Portelli, 2006). 
  
The case is based largely on 50 hours of interviews with the key informants over two 





generations of the family business. These interviews initially followed a chronological 
order before moving onto specific themes, including boat customs and discrimination. 
These discussions were often facilitated by the presentation of old family photos. The 
aim of the interviews is to focus on their personal experience, rather than their 
subjective opinions of issues that they did not experience first-hand. Other 
information unrelated to the family business, such as family dynamics and personal 
interests, were also included in the interviews. These interviewees nevertheless 
provide some good sources of information regarding the personality of the informant 
as well as the context of which they and their family business was based; many oral 
historians argued that these are extremely important to the decision making processes 
elsewhere (Welsh, 2000). Repeated interviews were conducted and interviewees were 
asked to return to previously provided information for further elaboration.  
 
Prologue and the research context 
 
The Yip family came from a nomadic fisherfolks background living on junks and 
fishing crafts. The family was based in the bustling Victoria Harbour close to the 
central business district and various warehouses on both sides of the harbour. Before 
the full scale Japanese invasion of China, the family were already operating a ship-to-
shore transportation business carrying goods between open seas freighters anchored in 
the middle of the harbour and warehouses ashore. The family specialised in the 
delivery of coal, charcoal and high quality Singaporean firewood for industrial uses 
on a large scale, and possessed their own wooden trading coaster and sampans. 
Master Yip normally dealt directly with warehouse owners, managers, and middlemen 
who acted on behalf of the government or mostly large British corporations. His 
daughter described that Master Yip was “fairly well-known within the harbour and 
was extremely well-connected”. The nucleus of the Yip family consisted of the master, 
his two wives, the elder daughter, and three younger sons.  
 
However, despite their status in the harbour, they, like many other fisherfolks at the 
time, felt marginalised by the mainstream society. Ward (1965) described the boat 
people as “dragons on water, worms on shore”, as most of them were born, married 
and died on their boats, with restricted interaction with landsmen as a result of 
centuries of stigmatisation, marginalisation and humiliation (Anderson, 1972; Ward 
1985; Chan, 2000). Discrimination was a topic that was mentioned by members from 
the family, with some provided extensive accounts of these experiences, their fear of 
being discriminated, and general difficulties to integrate into the mainstream society. 
The lack of interaction discouraged the dissemination of outside sources of 
knowledge and competence (Nonaka, 1994), which held back their development for 
few centuries. Interesting, it was the same isolation that allowed the boat families in 
this study to develop their unique advantage during the war, and effectively prohibited 
landsmen to share their fortune at a time of general hardship. Decades of close 
interaction amongst a small and isolated group helped them to develop trust and 
repeated interaction with each others. In addition, common context helped to develop 
routines, practices and terminologies and enhanced the flow of knowledge through 
alliance and aid interpretation (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003) amongst boat people.  
Nevertheless, such closeness may restrict knowledge acquisition as they may merely 
duplicate pre-existing capabilities.  
 
Early part of the Japanese occupation in Hong Kong  
 
In December 1941 Japan captured Hong Kong and occupied the territory for three 
years and eight months. The strategic importance of Hong Kong as a transhipment 
centre for the proposed co-prosperity sphere meant that it was treated differently from 
other Japanese colonies (Lau, 2009, p.2) and other foreign concessions in China that 
were returned to the Japanese-supported Chinese collaborationist government 
(Lethbridge, 1969, p.97). Instead Hong Kong was put under the direct control of the 
Imperial Armed Force, who governed Hong Kong with a highly-centralised, military-
driven management approach (Lethbridge, 1969, p.97; Chow, 2007, p.1). As Japan 
continued to intensify their warfare in other parts of Asia, trading with outside the 
sphere became impossible. Rations for rice, cooking oil, sugar, salt and other food and 
food-processing commodities began one month after the occupation (Tse, 1995, 
p.114). Likewise, fuels were classified as strategic military resources and the 
distribution of these resources were severely restricted and centralised (Tse, 1995, 
p124). Private trade and distribution of these resources were prohibited. Few 
households and corporations were entitled to the use of gas and electricity (Cheng, 
2006), while rations were imposed on household fuels, such as charcoal, firewood and 
matches (Cheng, 2006). The Japanese authority took charge of most strategic 
enterprises including pubic utilities, public transport and certain heavy industrial 
plants (Snow, 2003, p.156), retained possession of most warehouses and goods within 
them (Snow, 2003, p.168-170), and craved-up small but strategic local businesses, 
such as light factories, either through direct buy-out or forced partnership with 
Japanese elites who resumed control of productions (Snow, 2003, p.157). Physical 
movements of human were severely restricted except for out-migration that alleviated 
general shortages. The authority imposed an all-night curfew on all non-Japanese 
nationals and set up numerous checkpoints across the territory.  
Whilst many other families lost their production capacities owing to the 
destructions of physical investment, loss of manpower and confiscations of resources, 
as mentioned by numerous authors, the uneven destruction and redistribution of 
power of war often create enormous if somewhat uneven and arbitrary entrepreneurial 
opportunities (Gottschalk, 2009; Coble, 2003). The ill-fated businesses of many 
others were in sharp contrast with the fortune of the Yip family, which managed to 
maintain linear continuality. It is hard to explain why the Yip family were allowed to 
maintain continuity when many others were forced out of the harbour. However, a 
narrative from another entrepreneur revealed that the Japanese’s preference of a 
centralised logistical network may have led to the selection of a small number of key 
operators and forced the smaller operators to coerce with their larger contingents. 
Such command-and-control strategy is understandable given that the overarching aim 
was to efficiently exploit Hong Kong’s transhipment capacity. The choice of the Yip 
family therefore reflected their relative status in the harbour, their knowledge in the 
trade, their infrastructures, and their relatively well-developed network. Such unique 
pre-existing resource and knowledge bases are impossible for competitors or potential 
new entries to imitate. As a result of the war, these resources also became non-
substitutable due to lack of transportation alternative and therefore highly valuable.   
A 2
nd
 generation family member explained that working for the Japanese was 
essentially the same as working for the British, as they were both absence from the 
harbour and both relied on their middlemen who are Chinese. Their existing 
knowledge remain the foundation for their business. Nevertheless, they had to ‘learn a 
few things’ to adapt to the new order. In this episode these learning are exploitative 
and mostly about contextual issues. Most notably they had to learn to operate most 
efficiently within the new restricted trade hours due to curfew and restrictive 
movement beyond the harbour. This required some night operations to cease, and 
required them to move some of the operations, such as cleaning of the equipment, to 
their resident boat where they were required to stay during the night. In this episode, 
most of the learning required was for the adaption to the new environment and a new 
culture, which altered very little the core of their businesses but nevertheless essential 
for their survival. They therefore learn exploitatively by engaging in the process of 
incremental augmentation and then reassess for changes that they made.    
 
Continued struggle and the rise of new entrepreneurial opportunities  
 
Shortages of food and fuels were intensified by the last months of 1942, when Japan 
began to lose grounds on the Pacific front. The American navel blockade that aimed 
to prohibit Japanese reinforcement and re-supply efforts resulted in the sinking of 
roughly one merchant ship per day, and destroyed over million tons of shipments 
(Snow, 2003, p.167). Hong Kong’s overseas trade was being strangulated. If anything, 
Japan became more determined to ensure the colony’s meagre resources were 
reserved for military purpose. Food situation was desperate for civilians (Tse, 1995, 
p122-123; Tse, 1995, p.120; Cheng, 2006; Snow, 2003. p209) and rations for many 
food related commodities and their substitutes became irregular and eventually 
discontinued (Tse, 1995, p.120; Cheng, 2006; Snow, 2003. p209). Fuel situation was 
equally dire. By August 1944, coal stocks were exhausted (Snow, 2003, p206) and 
gas and electricity supplies were suspended (Cheng, 2006). Without fuel, public 
transports were grounded to a halt and only very few manufacturing production could 
continued. At household level, prices of rationed firewood went up by more than 8 
times between 1942 and 1944, before the authority stopped providing it to the public 
altogether by October (Cheng, 2006). These excess demands rapidly turned Hong 
Kong into an anthill of hoarding, speculation and black marketeering (Snow, 2003, 
p.123). Despite outlawed, profit-seeking farmers from the outliers continued to bring 
their food production into the territory (Tse, 1995, p.117). Black market price for fuel 
also rocketed (Cheng, 2006). Enterprising individuals began to collect woods and 
leafs – practices that were often discouraged by the law enforcement (Snow, 2003). 
Some began to sell pieces of furniture taken from their homes, whilst workers from 
gas and electricity plants sold reused coal in the market. These were of course illegal 
behaviours and subjected to severe punishments if caught.  
 
The Yip family became involved in the illegal fuel trade. Initially, the family 
collected the leftovers from their hauling activities, bagged them and resold them to 
other haulers within the harbour. Coal picking is a long-standing practice mutually 
understood by the hauler and those who requested the transportation as an alternative 
to tipping, however, as the trading of fuel became extremely profitable, the family 
began to systematically extract coals from their shipments. Employees would kick any 
dropped items to the invisible parts of the boats and into cracks between wooden 
planks on the flooring. When offloading coals from gunny bags they would hold onto 
two handfuls to take back to the boat. As profit grew, the family began to invest 
substantially in the diversification. They acquired more boats and also began to 
acquire other sources of coals including buying from coolies and other suppliers. In 
addition, the family also began to collaborate with outsiders. They set up strategic 
alliances with their extended family members with the agreement to share carriers and 
labourers. Joint venture between the Yip family and their extended family were also 
set up for the purpose of boat purchase.  
 
Reconfiguration of labourer also occurred within the business empire. Master Yip 
continued to be the figurehead who drove forward this extended empire, and his 
extensive knowledge about the coal market and network within the harbour remained 
crucial to the development of the business. This includes not only the buyers and the 
sellers, but also the water police who were willing to turn a blind eye to their illegal 
operation, and tipped them off when Japanese inspectors arrived in the harbour. Other 
male members were involved in the running of boats and physical duties, while 
female and junior family members cleaned, maintained and repaired retail equipments. 
Family members who lived on the residential boats would also act as security guards 
during the low tide to prevent petty thefts of spare coals that were deposited into the 
sea attached to the residential boat by a rope. The fuel trading business went really 
well during the last days of war and the family lived a fairly comfortable existence in 
the harbour, contrasting sharply with the harsh environment faced by the general 
population.  
 
In this episode, despite the new business activity, the learning requires to move into 
the new business opportunity remain largely exploitative. They have moved into the 
new market of illegal fuel, which has very different rules and norms to the haulage 
market that they were involved in. However, the fact that the family have already 
possess skills in haulage and in handling fuel, as well as their knowledge of the local 
market forms the platform, makes the learning exploitative and incremental from their 
pre-existing skillsets. This enables them to pick up the new learning that other was 
unable to do so and springboard onto the new market of illegal fuel trade that was 
taking place within the harbour. As the learning was made possible through the 
internal configuration of the family business, the subsequent entrepreneurial 
opportunity that they discovered was difficult to imitate by the outsiders. It is also 
important to note that learning was largely localised with the family remained on the 
waterfront throughout the episode. The skills that they need to require was about the 
specific rules and norms of a particular sector which was highly localised.  
 
Although the Yip family prospected throughout the period, and that taking up 
additional entrepreneurial (often illegal) activities was not uncommon, many others 
fisherfolks struggled far more. Pre-existing resource and knowledge bases appear to 
be particularly essential for exploitative learning that is essential for the successful 
exploitation of opportunity recognition. For the Yip family, the possession of physical 
assets, the extensive network connection within the harbour, and the green light given 
by the Japanese enabled the family to immediately recognise the new opportunities 
and make incremental reconfiguration to their resources base in order to utilise the 
new opportunity. Others without such strong resource base had to look for alternative 
opportunities that are less profitable. Many had to leave their boats and went on shore, 
some even away from the territory. In the case of the Yip family, opportunity 
recognition depended largely on the successful exploitation of local knowledge and 
resources base. Similarly, the family families sought finance and collaboration from 
friends and family at a time when external resources acquisition would otherwise be 
impossible.  
 
Explorative learning, on the other hand, was seen as highly difficult to achieve 
during the war. The uncertainties associated with resources availability, demand and 
supply are largely uncertain, making risk taking a very dangerous task, as there is 
little an entrepreneurial firm who wasted their effort and resources on failed learning 
can fall back on.  
 
Post War Epilogue  
 
When Japan surrendered in August 1945, freight and other transhipment businesses 
resumed. The Yip family returned to haulage when the demand for illegal coal 
plummeted after the war. However, during the war the family acquired considerable 
physical resources for the fuel trading activity, and the excess capacity now resulted 
in high running costs. Nevertheless, business reconfiguration and internal merger for 
cost reduction was considered as socially undesirable as they would affect the family 
dynamics between siblings. Due to the low demand of fuel transportation, most of the 
family members diversified into other food and products. However, as their boats got 
older, the siblings ran into a vicious circle of boat deterioration, lower demand due to 
worsening boat appearance, lower revenue, lower investment in maintenance, and 
further boat deterioration. Eventually, many of the off-shoots, such as those operated 
by the 2
nd
 generation family members, had to close down their branches of the 
business in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Without a boat dwelling of a good 
condition, all three left their fisherfolk lifestyle behind and went on shore to search for 
employment opportunities. Master Yip’s status within the harbour faded and when 
Master Yip passed away in the 1960s, his only carrier was succeeded by his youngest 
son, who continues the family business until this day. Containerisation further 
diminished their profit and with the family now based on shore and his sons finding 




Although empirical work examining the two aspects of learning (explorative and 
exploitative) is now extensive, work concerning the successful development of 
exploitative learning in the face of war and conflict is still very limited. Through a 
detailed comparative examination of the history of a family business in the backwater 
of Hong Kong for a period of over half a century, this qualitative, exploratory 
research contributes to a clearer understanding of the nature of explorative learning 
both at times of war and peace. Our findings point to the different roles of exploitative 
and explorative learning at different types of evolutionary environments. We found 
that, at times of war and conflict, firms are limited both geographically and 
technologically in their search for new knowledge. The harsh reality of life made 
explorative learning and the radical search of opportunity discussed in Baron (2006), 
Ardichvili et al. (2003) and Rosenkoft and Nerkar (2001) a far less desirable option, 
as the forgone income can be critical to survival. Under such condition, most 
entrepreneurial organisations are stimulated to exploit their existing knowledge 
competencies to learn to become involved in new entrepreneurial opportunities. This 
is consistent with Bhave (1994), who found that firms are restricted from engaging in 
risky radical explorative behaviour in such a context. Consequently, we found that the 
ability of an organisation to exploit local resources and knowledge that are unique, 
non-replicable and coveted becomes crucial. In other words, being at the right place at 
the right time largely determines the success of war businesses.  
 
On the other hand, at the time of peace, whether to engage in local exploitative or 
radical explorative learning becomes a matter of organisational choice. Consistent 
with previous research, our exploratory finding suggests that, under this type of 
evolutionary environment, it is the willingness to engage only in exploitative learning, 
and the refusal to engage in radical external explorative learning that is most likely to 
lead to low organisational performance. In essence, the family took a logical 
incremental approach involving mainly exploitative learning, and was left behind by 
the rapid development of post-war Hong Kong. They adapted essentially the same 
approach as they had used during the war, which was to springboard onto new 
opportunities through existing capacities and a bit of localised exploitative learning. 
This approach means that they were unable to acquire new knowledge and 
competencies that may be useful for them to look beyond the harbour. Whilst the 
harbour had been their fertile playground in the past, it became much less fruitful after 
the war due to the return of other forms of transportation. Local exploitative learning 
thus became less productive, and the limitations of local network and alliances with 
firms of similar background became apparent. Whilst a number of fisherfolks went on 
land to search for further opportunities, they family was reluctant to do so not due to 
lack of financial strength, but due to the uncertainties associated with such move. In 
other words, it was their reluctance to learn exploratively confined them to a life in 
the harbour.   
 
In addition, successes of exploitative learning during the war as well as the 
absence of entrepreneurial spirit appeared to have trapped the family within their pre-
existing core competencies, and resulted in their unwillingness to explore new 
opportunities elsewhere as suggested by Sorenson and Stuart (2000). When asked, a 
2
nd
 generation family member felt that moving ashore would expose them to the 
uncertainties that lie ahead, whilst the harbour is where they were born and brought 
up and they had everything they wanted there. Ironically, it was precisely such core 
rigidity that ultimately forced them to abandon their boat lifestyle. The family became 
dangerously exposed to external demand fluctuation, and when exogenous changes 
made their core competencies obsolete, they had no choice but to leave the livelihood 
that were so familiar to them behind. Therefore, just as few businesses made 
successful transformation from land to water during the time of war, few made it the 
opposite direction at the time of peace. Nevertheless, such transformation was by no 
means impossible, as illustrated by the parallel story of Henry Fok, a prominent 




The findings of this paper contribute to the understanding of business growth and 
development, both at times of war and conflict and the subsequent peace era. 
Although some studies have looked at the way entrepreneurship contributed to the 
post-conflict economies, however, due to data limitation, very few examined the 
nature of entrepreneurship at times of war and conflict, and, for the same reason, from 
a longitudinal perspective. Utilising a qualitative approach through a unique 
combination of historical archive, autobiography and interviews, our study managed 
to examine a family businesses – before, during and after war and conflict. Despite 
embedded in the past, we argue that our findings offer a number of managerial and 
policy implications.  
 
In terms of managerial implication, we believe that exploitative learning offer 
entrepreneurial firms a chance to survive through the difficulties associated with the 
war and conflict environment. It is very important for entrepreneurial firms not to be 
disheartened by such environment, but instead, utilising their resource and 
competencies as the basis of their exploitative learning, which enables them to pursue 
further opportunities leading to better life prospects.  
 
In terms of policy implication, we believe that knowing how wartime entrepreneurial 
businesses behaved both at times of conflict and peace can help revealing the type of 
entrepreneurs who are most likely to make the successful transformation, thus 
providing further understanding of how entrepreneurship can contribute to the 
reconstruction of post-conflict economy, as well as the types of support that policy 
makers can provide in lubricating the transformation process for these entrepreneurs. 
A question for policy maker could be whether they could offer any support to 
facilitate the transformation of wartime enterprises in a post-conflict environment. 
Our exploratory study found that success at the time of conflict created core rigidity 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992) and competencies trap, being consistent with previous finding 
such as Dunning and Lundan (2010) and Sorenson and Stuart (2000). In our case, 
such rigidness appears to be attributed to irreversible reconfigurations as well as lack 
of long term vision beyond their existing activities, as suggested by Schreyogg and 
Kliesch-Eberl (2007). Whilst the Schumpeterian (1942) or classical evolutionary 
economics’ point of view suggested that such creative destruction is neither unusual 
nor unhealthy, however, in the particular context of war and conflict, the skills, 
knowledge and resources accumulated by the Yip family can contribute greatly to 
post-war economic recovery. Therefore there is perhaps a role for the likes of Master 
Yip to be at the forefront of the recovery process. As problems with entrepreneurial 
businesses lies with their lack of adventurism and core rigidity, policy makers can 
help them to overcome challenges and prepare them for change, such as through 
financial incentives or educational supports. Experiences of post-war South Korea in 
the 1950s suggested that such winner-picking behaviour by the government resulted 
in the efficient utilisation of pre-existing resources, and enabled these “chaebols” to 
compete in a global environment.  
 
While this work takes an important first step towards understanding the processes of 
exploitation learning at the time of war and conflict, this study has a number of 
limitations. First of all, it is important to bear in mind that entrepreneurship is 
embedded in the context that it is based. Each war and conflict situation is unique in 
itself and therefore further study with relation to the subject is required before a 
convincing conclusion can be obtained. Second, we focus on the livelihood of one 
entrepreneurial family as the in-depth longitudinal approach requires considerable 
effort. However, the family may or may not be representative of an average case 
entrepreneurial family. In fact, may families would have flee the conflict zone 
altogether. Further studies including entrepreneurial families of different nature will 
be needed. Finally, further research, perhaps utilising a quantitative approach, is 
essential in understanding the entrepreneurship qualities required for both surviving 
the war as well as being able to make a successful transformation when peace returns.    
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